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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SCOTT ALAN MOORE, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
) 
CASE NO. 42405 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
Of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada 
The Honorable Melissa Moody, Presiding. 
RANDALL S. BARNUM 
Barnum Howell, PLLC 
PO Box 2616 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 336-3600 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General of the State of Idaho 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief Mr. Moore argues that the prosecutor's unqualified objection to Mr. 
Moore's petition for an amendment to his judgment pursuant to LC. 19-2604(3) constitutes a 
exercise of the statute that unconstitutionally delegates lawmaking and/or judicial powers to 
prosecutors in violation of the Separation of Powers. Mr. Moore further argues that the 
unbridled, arbitrary exercise of such authority further deprived him of his right to Equal 
Protection. In the Respondent's brief the State argues that its objection, unrelated to and 
uniformed by the substantive statutory criteria for relief, constitutes a permissible executive 
authority, a "veto," of the statutory criteria entitling Mr. Moore to the petitioned for relief. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
L Does the Jurisdictional Requirement That Prosecutor Stipulate to Relief Sought 
Under Idaho Code § 19-2604 Violate Separation of Powers? 
II. Does Idaho Code§ 19-2604 Violate the Appellant's Equal Protection Rights Under 
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 2 of the 
Idaho Constitution? 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The State argues that Moore has failed to demonstrate an improper divestment of 
legislative authority, clarifying instead that the prosecutor's objection constitutes a prosecutorial 
veto: 
LC. 19-2604(3) simply grants the prosecutor the limited power to stipulate to, or 
to veto, an individual's attempt to obtain a reduction of his felony sentence, where 
the individual is otherwise eligible to petition for such relief under the criteria set 
forth in the statute. 
Brief of Respondent, p. 7. 
The State is able to pivot its claimed authority away from Mr. Moore's challenge to the 
prosecutor's objection as a legislative or judicial exercise simply as a.function of the prosecutor's 
arbitrary refusal to disclose its rationale for abstaining from stipulating to Moore's application 
for relief. Whether the prosecutor's objection resulted from an adoption and application of its 
own de facto eligibility criteria constituting legislative exercise, its own adjudication of the 
propriety of Moore's application against the statute as a judicial exercise, or an exercise of 
administrative authority in "vetoing" Moore's application, is veiled by the prosecutor's refusal to 
disclose its rationale for objecting to Moore's application for relief. This failure constitutes an 
arbitrary, unfair, and unjust abuse of discretion regardless of whichever otherwise coordinate 
branch of government it purports to derive its authority. 
A. Post-Judgment Exercise of Prosecutorial Veto Violates Separation of Powers 
Even should the court ente1iain the State's argument that I. C. § 19-2604( c) does not 
constitute an impermissible delegation oflegislative authority, but instead constitutes a 
prosecutorial veto, the prosecutor's exercise of LC.§ 19-2604(c) in the instant case violates the 
Separation of Powers. 
The prosecutor's veto of Moore's application for relief is an exercise outside the scope of 
a prosecutor's properly delegated executive authority. Only the governor may exercise veto, the 
prosecutor is not the governor, and the governor may only exercise veto power within ten days of 
a bill's passage and before the bill becomes law. Const. art. 4, § 10. Even in the event that a veto 
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were an ongoing authority, the governor may only exercise veto of particularized legislative 
provisions within a bill in the appropriation of money. Const. art. 4, § 11. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reserved the Constitutional authority to adjudicate 
applications for post-judgment relief to the judiciary. Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution provides as follows: "The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pe1iains to it as a coordinate department of 
government." In State v. Easley the Idaho Supreme Court resolved the question of the propriety 
of the State's exercise of a post-judgment prosecutorial veto, holding that post judgment 
eligibility determinations are an exclusive authority of the judiciary: 
Easley argues that because the prosecutor was making eligibility determinations 
for the mental health court post-judgment rather than pre-judgment, it was 
exercising judicial functions. Easley is co1Tect. The post-judgment prosecutorial 
veto violates the Separation of Powers doctrine. Whatever authority 
prosecutors have as 'judicial officers," that authority does not extend to 
determining sentencing when a defendant has been adjudicated guilty of a 
violation. That is the comi's authority. It cannot be contracted away. 
State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214,221,322 P.3d 296,303 (2014) (emphasis added). 
As in Easley, where the prosecutor's post-judgment "veto" of a defendant's jurisdictional 
access to relief was held to violate the Separation of Powers, here Moore has applied for post-
judgment relief but has been denied the relief by a prosecutor's arbitrary veto. The jurisdictional 
bar to post-judgment relief in the absence of a prosecutor's stipulation is a violation of the 
Separation of Powers. 
The Court's retention of Constitutional authority for post-judgment relief eligibility 
determinations is most consistent with the statutory criteria providing for fair and just relief 
where petitioning parties substantively demonstrate appropriate conduct subsequent to their 
sentence. Likewise, retaining this authority to the court best provides that all paiiies and 
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coordinate branches of government adhere to a diligent consideration of the substantive intent of 
the statute in adjudicating the propriety of relief. Further, judicial authority best allows each 
coordinate branch of government to exercise their respective roles in a manner most consistent 
with the Constitutional principles of the Separation of Powers and Equal Protection of the law. 
Where the prosecutor's claim to authority exceeds its Constitutional limit and transgresses into 
the exercise of de facto law-making, judicial authority, or a case-by-case veto, its unbridled 
exercise invites arbitrary application, as occurred in the instant case, an unaccountable discretion 
prone to unfair and unjust government conduct that offend Equal Protection principles. 
B. Exercise of Prosecutorial Veto Constitutes Fundamental Error 
The State argues that Moore failed to preserve by objecting to the prosecutor's objection 
to Moore's petition for relief on Separation of Powers grounds. Moore petitioned the court to 
amend his judgment, the prosecutor objected to the petition on jurisdictional grounds, Moore's 
attorney argued that the court enjoyed jurisdiction and the comi ruled it lacked jurisdiction. In 
Easley the court held that an Appellant need not demonstrate unequivocal authority resolving 
issues in an appellant's favor in order to demonstrate fundamental error. Easley, 156 Idaho at 
221, 322 P.3d at 303. As in Easley, where the court held that the appellant had argued for the 
comi's jurisdiction to grant relief on numerous grounds and that the comi's decision was clear, 
requiring no further factual support, here Moore's application and subsequent argument for relief 
were denied on jurisdictional grounds and the fundamental e1Tor is clear without the need for 
further evidence. 
The error was not harmless, Moore presented the comi with strong evidence of his 
compliance with the substantive statutory criteria entitling him to relief, establishing that he was 
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a good candidate for the relief. The prosecutor's objection was not offered with any supporting 
evidence that Moore would not be entitled to relief were it not for the alleged jurisdictional bar. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecutor's arbitrary abuse of its authority has deprived a man of a fair and just 
adjudication, as guaranteed by the comi' s proper exercise of its coordinate authority, of the 
substantive merit--as prescribed by the legislature's proper exercise of its coordinate authority--
of his application for post-judgment relief. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Idaho Code§ 19-2604(3) violates A1iicle II,§ 
1 and Article V, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution in violating the Separation of Powers by 
unconstitutionally delegating the prosecutor lawmaking or judicial authority that is exclusively 
reserved to the judiciary. Furthermore, Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) violates Article I, § 2 of the 
Idaho Constitution and the Fomieenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that 
Appellant has been denied equal protection under the law. 
It is respectfully requested that this this comi find that this matter be remanded back to 
District Comi for further proceedings on the merit of Mr. Moore's application. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of February, 2014. 
1{{:f;l!;= 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and c01Tect copy of the above and foregoing document was 
hand-delivered and/or mailed, postage prepaid, this t8 day of February, 2015 to: 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General of the State of Idaho 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
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